Chapter 3, 3.5-3.7

3.5 The Role of the Moscow Patriarchate.

The need for dialogue has assumed nearly an imperative character (“dialogue at any cost”) for the Roman Church, whereas the Church of Moscow considers this dialogue profitable only for the Catholic side, since, according to Moscow , it serves as a cover up for the prozelytizing expansion of Catholicism. It appears that the Russian Orthodox Church does not feel ready for dialogue, and, therefore, makes efforts to avoid it at any cost. This conclusion is sometimes questioned. Therefore, I would like to refer to the argumentation of a well-known Russian theologian, Deacon Andrei Kuraiev:

"Under the conditions of the destruction of the traditions of church theology, schooling and education, it would be somewhat naïve to seek full-scale dialogue with a structure like the Vatican . It is necessary to heal our own wounds, understand who we are, remind ourselves of our own history, reach at least our prerevolutionary level… How can one enter a dialogue with another society, culture, tradition without first knowing oneself?" 77

In response to this logic, one can single out a few weak points. First , Orthodoxy is not a modern religious movement which needs safe isolation during its embryonal maturation. The main problem of present Slavic Orthodoxy is the fact that, as a rule, it guards its invaluable capital, Eastern theology, but does not use it. Thereby, it can be likened, if you will, to the unwise servant from the Gospel, who hid the talent which he had received from his master (comp. Matt. 25, 14-30). And it is only by making use of theology, multiplying its “capital” and putting the talent into circulation in the “market of ideas,” in dialogue, a lively exchange of thoughts and application of the theological freedom of the Church Fathers, that will solve the complicated problems of our time.

Second: perhaps there is no need for Slavic Orthodoxy to revive itself in its prerevolutionary forms? Have Orthodox theologians forgotten the desperate call of a Russian bishop of that time who participated in the National Sobor of the ROC (1917-1918):

Enough of this alliance with the state! In the past our bones cracked in the heavy embrace of the protector-state, as they do now in persecutions of the Bolsheviks. No, we do not want carriages and stagecoaches, we will walk and be free, like sectarians, relying on our faithful. … It is not the state, which is changing its appearance catastrophically, but a believing society that is the guarantee of a strong church order, which is already accepted by the Russian Church , and for giving up which there are no grounds at the time of the future liberation of Russia from communist bondage. 78

Perhaps the fact that the communist axe separated Slavic Orthodoxy from its pre-revolutionary form was, in this sense, an expression of God's grace as it gave Orthodoxy the chance to get grafted to modernity?

Third, getting to know oneself in isolation very often maintains neglected illnesses and reproduces the most odious and non-viable concepts. Some would consider today's Russian church press is a confirmation of this.

However, in the view of Greek Catholics it is this reluctance to enter into dialogue that explains the invariable shifting of the blame onto the “Uniates” for upsetting the dialogue. Greek Catholics are convinced that the Moscow Patriarchate desperately needs “evidence” of persecution of the Orthodox in Halychyna, for example, as without this its main construct of propaganda falls apart. In fact, the use of the present continuous tense to describe persecutions of the Orthodox in Halychyna (they “are being persecuted, beaten, killed, etc.” 79) deserves amazement, as it has not been reflective of the real situation for a long time. This all indicates the existence of a certain propagandistic formula, which, by the way, inflicts losses on all parties: Greek Catholics become “scapegoats,” Orthodox of the Moscow jurisdiction in Halychyna become hostages of big politics, and the Moscow Patriarchate itself becomes a victim of its own incapability to overcome the inertness of its policy.

I have no doubt that some circles in Moscow are also concerned about the inflexibility of the ROC's position. But I am afraid that, as long as the trick of the “red card for Uniates” brings forth fruits it will be used. This trick is a mirror reflexion of the Catholic imperative “dialogue at any cost.” If one is not willing to enter dialogue, it is advisable to set too high a price, which would be impossible to pay.

The reluctance of the Russian Orthodox Church to take an active part in the ecumenical process (and not simply to attend ecumenical meetings in order to make its position known) is combined with the desire to keep its monopoly on the formation of religious processes in the post-Soviet space. In this view, the monopoly becomes a synonym of church power, and its loss becomes a synonym for defeat. This dooms Moscow to a positional conflict in two respects (at least, in the case of Ukraine ).

First , the Moscow Patriarchate seeks to remove Rome and Constantinople from the competition field at any cost instead of seeking understanding with them in the issue of “untying” the Ukrainian church knot. With respect to Rome , it can be explained away by an argument about “Catholic expansion,” which is usual for the Orthodox mentality; whereas with respect to Constantinople 's position, the Moscow Patriarchate is trying to find traces of “crypto-Catholicism” in Patriarch Bartholomew, schemes of the USA and NATO, and so on. And, of course, for some time the Moscow Patriarchate will be able to appeal to the anti-western sentiments of its faithful and mobilize them to “protect true Orthodoxy.” The geopolitical international situation is currently conducive to this.

However, that church will thereby drive itself into a dead end (or, to be more exact, into a catastrophe), as it will increasingly rely upon its darkest, most undialogical and obscurantist circles. The deformation between the civilizational and anticivilizational segments of the church will eventually become excessive, which may cause a schism of the church community. Even today one sometimes hears the opinion that the current inflexibility of the ROC's position is partly due precisely to the reluctance of the church hierarchy to resort to radical changes, which may cause the development of threatening cracks in the church body. This fear is understandable but the strategy formed by it will hardly be salvific for the church, as life itself will demand that the hierarchy make different decisions and resort to qualitatively different methods to protect the interests of its own church.

Second , Moscow 's claims on church monopoly in Ukraine , irrespective of its degree of success, doom Moscow itself to an everlasting confrontation with independent tendencies in the Kyivan Church . A replacement of the monopoly strategy by the strategy of participation would help protect the interests of the Russian- or Moscow-oriented Orthodox population of Ukraine without tying them to imperialistic ambitions, and in a civilized way. I am actually talking about the British post-imperial model of rational anticipation of events, allowing the avoidance of a complete break of relations and reaching friendly cooperation instead, even though it is not close. The future will show if this change is possible.

Both cases are not about removing patriarchal Moscow from the ecumenical dialogue but, on the contrary, about freeing up this dialogue. It is only the claims of the Moscow Patriarchate to monopoly in the ecumenical process that are to be questioned and not, by any means, its right to participate in the process. It is exactly the removal of certain churches from the ecumenical dialogue that was the main error of its last phase. The replacement of removed churches would not bring a qualitative change to the situation and, apparently, would not activate the ecumenical dialogue.

However, neither will it be possible to set the ecumenical “cart” in motion if everything remains unchanged. The tactic of “getting around Moscow,” typical of the age of ostpolitik, only sustained Moscow's hopes to still be able to keep the present tactic, in particular to keep the national churches in Ukraine (not to mention the churches of Belarus!) away from the dialogue in the future and, thereby, to maintain its monopoly. The sooner the Russian Orthodox Church realizes that it is impossible to enter “the eye of the needle” of the third millenium with such a load, the sooner it will take its real and harmonious place in the Christian oecumene. It appears to be clear even in the Kremlin but still not in the St. Daniel monastery.

The situation in the World Council of Churches shows that, today, the Christian community needs the voice of the Eastern churches, which would not be dominated by the rejection of modernity and artificial prevention of changes but by a bold and friendly healing of modernity . It will be very difficult to achieve this if the Russian Orthodox Church is not open and prepared for dialogue. One has to distinguish between natural conservatism and the sickness of reactionism. The conservatism of Orthodoxy in general (as compared to Catholicism and Protestantism) and, in particular, Russian Orthodoxy (against the background of other churches of the East) has played and will continue to play a positive role. This statement is based on the conviction that a stabilizing conservatism has the same value for the progress of humanity as does a flexibility toward change.

Reactionism and obscurantism, on the other hand, are results of the degeneration and sickness of conservatism. For all its inflexibility, conservatism is still dialogical, that is to say it realizes and appreciates its dialectal links with its antipod. Obscurantism develops a sectarian mentality in a church body, which destroys dialogism and locks the church in the “fortress of its own truth” (Patriarch Athenagoras). This danger was emotionally described by the deputy rector of Saint Filaret's Higher Orthodox-Christian school of Moscow , Margarita Shylkina:

Can it be that we are witnessing the fulfilment of the prophecy of Mother Maria (Skobtsova), in which she said as early as in 1936 that the recognition of the church in Russia and growth of its outward success will lead to restriction of freedom, increase of heresy-mania and the annihilation of opponents? Cadres brought up by the Soviet power in the psychology of a search for infallible decisions will be even bigger eradicators of “heresies” and protectors of “Orthodoxy” in the area of Orthodox doctrine. May it not happen! For this is not only far from Orthodoxy, but far from Christianity! 80

Therefore, the world needs the conservative but, at the same time, dialogical Russian Orthodoxy, whereas a church, which relies on the obscurantism of the darkest part of its faithful, dooms itself.

3.6. The Role of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The crisis in relations between the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchs about the jurisdiction of the Estonian Orthodox Church caused a lively discussion on the possibility that the Patriarch of Constantinople's next step will be the recognition of the autocephalous status of one of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches.

Among others, the optimistic statements of Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate appeared in the press at that time. The optimism of these expectations proved to be premature but, on the other hand, the current position of the Patriarch of Constantinople cannot be considered final, either. It is considered that Constantinople never officially renounced its status as the mother-church of Kyiv, notwithstanding the fact that the Patriarchate of Constantinople has actually tolerated the passage of the Kyivan Patriarchate under the jurisdiction of Moscow Patriarchate in 1686 for three hundred years, according to Constantinopolitan dignitaries themselves. 81 It is also noteworthy that when he admitted the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the USA under his mantle, Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople said that he recognized the Moscow Patriarchate only within the borders of 1591. 82 All this really gives ground to the belief that the old historical controversy over the Kyivan Metropolitanate between Constantinople and Moscow may revive in some new form in the future.

At the same time, after 11 September 2001 , the geopolitical situation in the world changed drastically, which was bound to affect the geo-Christian situation. At least in the midst of the Episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate it is believed that the fact that the Patriarch of Constantinople became indifferent to the problem of Ukrainian autocephaly is due exactly to changes in geopolitics. 83 The actual suspension by Constantinople of the process of canonical recognition of both Ukrainian Orthodox churches, which proclaimed autocephalous status, took those churches by surprise. The reaction of the Kyivan Patriarchate to the hesitation of Constantinople apparently found expression in the appearance in America of sharply critical materials of Oksana Khomchuk, the editor of the magazine Ukrainians of America for a Kyivan Patriarchate . 84The materials mentioned, of course, are not official documents of the church but their appearance is an indication of the sentiments, which prevail in it (at least, in its American branch).

It is too early to come to any final conclusions about the future of the process of recognition of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly today. However, I am going to take the liberty of making at least a few remarks in this regard.

Moscow and, apparently, Constantinople view “the healing of the schism” in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as the process of its branches becoming individually dependent on one of the centres. Many Ukrainian Orthodox see it as a struggle in a vicious circle: in an effort to free oneself from one subjection, one is bound to get into another one. In an attempt to break free from the vicious circle, part of the Orthodox choose the previously mentioned ecclesial formula “neither Rome , nor Constantinople , nor Moscow ”; that is to say, “the liberation of Ukraine from the bondage of all three Romes.”

Well, there are many historic arguments against superiority of these centres, and such a position could even be seen as heroic in a way. However, it does not make this position any less hopeless. This conclusion is based not even on a pragmatic comparison of powers and opportunities (though it is very eloquent in itself). Primarily, it is based on the conviction of many past and present outstanding representatives of the Ukrainian Church that the historic mission of Ukrainian Christians is to reconcile the quarrelled branches of Christianity and not to open a third front against them. Therefore, stirring up hatred for any centre (no matter how deserved it is) must be considered inconsistent not just with evangelical imperatives but also with the identity and practical interests of the presently divided Church of Kyiv . For the logic of triple rejection is not conducive either to reconciliation inside Ukraine or to active international ecumenical initiatives from the autocephalous churches.

Despite the risk of being accused of holding a typically Greek Catholic viewpoint, I am going to formulate my own conclusion: the issue of Ukrainian Orthodoxy cannot be solved only along the Constantinople-Moscow line. The wavering of dependencies between Moscow and Constantinople , in my opinion, is an indication that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, as another branch of historic Kyivan Christian tradition and a representative of its openness to the Church of Rome, is left out of the solution of the issue of the unity of the Church of Kyiv . Both Rome and Constantinople today are objective factors in the positive solution of the stalemate situation of the Ukrainian churches since they both oppose Moscow 's monopolistic claims in their own ways. (This conclusion is fair even if one takes into account the fact that both Rome and Constantinople may have their own interests in Ukraine , different from the interests of the mentioned Ukrainian churches). It seems conclusive that the orientation towards Constantinople and Rome are organic parts of the Ukrainian Christian tradition, whereas the monopoly (and not just presence) of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine is artificial and counter-productive.

There is no doubt, as Andrii Yurash says, that,

…under the present circumstances, one can easily forecast the parallel existence of two canonical jurisdictions in Ukraine – one in full subjection to Moscow and the other in strategic partnership with Constantinople. That is to say, Ukraine will again find itself on the dividing line between the two church orientations, the two poles of Eastern Christian Orthodox spirituality. 85

I would like to add to this that the inclusion of the UGCC in the untying of the Ukrainian religious knot would determine the division of the Kyivan Church , this time between the three centres of Christianity. That is to say: each particular centre would “look after” some branch of the Kyivan Church . The negativist interpretation of this fact offers statements about the imperial ambitions of the three Romes. According to such an interpretation, it is really possible to say that only fundamental and harmonious unity is an alternative to schisms, and not the imperial “gathering of lands,” no matter which centre we are talking about.

However, I suggest looking at this situation from a different, positive point of view. For centuries, all three of the centres sought to resolve the problem of the unity of the Kyivan Church individually , and all these efforts failed sooner or later. Unfortunately, the tradition of keeping some centres away from the untying of the Ukrainian church knot has survived to date. Therefore, Ukrainian Christians alternately pinned their hopes on one particular centre, and those hopes were also deferred. Efforts to get rid of any dependencies proved futile as well. In my opinion, there is only one way out of the situation: to realize that any further political manipulations along the lines of old ecclesial models will drive the parties into a blind alley. What cannot be overcome should be taken as the will of Providence .

And positive sides thereof should also be considered. The three centres of Christianity never made an attempt to sit down jointly to the negotiating table with each other. Neither did Ukrainian Christians ever (at least in modern times) try to engage all three centres in the solution of their problems on a partnership basis. Of course, until recently the situation in the Christian world was not conducive to making such proposals. However, today, despite the old ambitions and resistance, there is actually an opportunity to test new models of coexistence. There is excessive inertia in ecclesial thinking with regard to the Ukrainian issue and a lack of positive proposals, which would engage all parties in cooperation instead of excluding some parties from the field of negotiations. This inertia may lead to considerable remorse on the conscience of both Ukrainian Christians and the leadership of the international centres of Christianity.

3.7. On the Issue of a Single Kyiv-Halych Patriarchate.

The problem of the patriarchate is very troublesome and ecumenically significant in today's Ukrainian context.

To begin with, in the eyes of Ukrainian and international communities, this issue has been considerably discredited by the “parade” of Ukrainian patriarchates proclaimed in the 20 th century. For example, in 1963 at the Second Vatican Council then-Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj raised the issue of the establishment of a UGCC patriarchate (and, actually, assumed the title of patriarch in 1975 for his office as head of the UGCC). In 1991, at the All-Ukrainian Sobor of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox, the Patriarchate of the UAOC was established and was headed by Patriarch Mstyslav (Skrypnyk). In 1992, as a result of the redistribution of influences between the UAOC and the-then UOC, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyivan Patriarchate was established and was headed by Patriarch Volodymyr (Romaniuk). The above mentioned decision of the UAOC hierarchy, made in 2000 to carry out the last will and testament of the late Patriarch Dymytrii (Yarema) and not to elect a new patriarch for some time – which was, basically, a very praiseworthy decision – was not able to outweigh the disappointing (for us) conclusion that Ukrainian Christians are not capable of bringing order into their patriarchal aspirations.

However, in this conclusion by people outside the church, not all aspects of the problem, by any means, were taken into account. For example, the proclamation of a number of Ukrainian patriarchates was not so much an indication of an increase of church ambitions, 86 as an indication of a growing feeling in the church awareness of Christians of the Kyivan tradition, that their churches were ready to assume the patriarchal title and manner of governance. The realization by Greek Catholics and the Autocephalous Orthodox of the fact of the great martyrdom of their churches under the Bolsheviks became the first motivating factor, as martyrdom has long been considered the ultimate (and, therefore, perfect) testimony of faith in the church. In addition, the revived churches increasingly gain in full-fledged ecclesial “flesh.” This thought was clearly sounded out in the speech of UGCC Patriarch Lubomyr (Husar) during the Divine Liturgy in Lviv with the participation of His Holiness John Paul II:

Today, Most Holy Father, the church stands before you in love and humbleness and ready to fulfil the new tasks which arise from our God-bearing Eastern tradition and church government, as well as from our honorary duty to the whole universal church. 87

The Vatican 's procrastination in recognizing the UGCC Patriarchate became one of the two little clouds which appeared in the basically light and cloudless Galician sky during the visit of the present Pope to Ukraine (the delay in the beatification of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky was the other one). Orthodox Ukrainians of autocephalous status also had a grudge against Constantinople until recently, and even today, that is, as of 2004, their position on the unification initiatives of Constantinople is still not definite. Both in the first and second cases, Ukrainians tend to believe that Rome and Constantinople give priority to political considerations, which, naturally, raises discontent and suspicions in the minds of the faithful. Very few people in Ukraine think about the providential significance of such procrastination. (Below, I will talk about the situation of the UGCC Patriarchate).

However well-motivated might be those who criticize the Vatican of the 1970s-‘80s for the excessively juridical character of its ecclesial thinking and the invariably hypnotic character of its inability to take its eyes off Moscow, nevertheless, its resistance to the Greek Catholics' struggle for patriarchal status played an important role. The establishment of a new patriarchate is an extraodinary event in the church sphere: there are very few other events of equal significance. A hasty decision in such an important step could cause lost opportunities for the church. However, if it were not for the assertiveness of Patriarch Joseph Slipyj, the justified prudence of the Vatican would have become an unforgivable rigidity. Only such an energetic “ram” as His Beatitude, Joseph I, could break the ecclesiological walls of the Curia. And the gift of prophecy is given only to those who are able to melt both prison bars and Siberian permafrost and the great callousness of rigid bureaucracy.

At the peak of the Vatican 's ostpolitik , Patriarch Joseph was right to predict that the policy of “cajoling Moscow ” pursued by the world churches at the time would fail. Several decades of these “ ostpolitik ” tests and mistakes did not go for naught, and today the model of the Vatican 's diplomacy with respect to Moscow seems to be slowly changing. Of course, from the point of view of the ordinary Greek Catholic, it is changing too slowly. And, in my opinion, there is a very practical explanation for this slowness: ostpolitik formed certain stereotypes of ecclesial thinking and behaviour, which were adopted by generations of Roman Catholics in seminaries, universities and academies. It is not so simple to overcome the acceptability of such stereotypes.

The fears of certain Curial factions are also inertial that the recognition of the UGCC Patriarchate by Rome “will harm the freedom of the Roman Catholics of Russia”. Traditionally, the fact that Rome sacrificed the interests of Greek Catholics more than once, and still does, is not considered. However, I am not sounding the call regularly to choose some “sacrifice for the ecumenical dragon.” I suggest coming out of the vicious circle of “sacrifice” altogether, getting rid of out-dated approaches to relations with patriarchal Moscow and entering the international arena with new and bold ideas, which will bring a qualitative change to the ecumenical paradigm.

However, the Greek Catholic way of thinking, in its turn, also shows immobility. For it is easy to guess what kind of position would be considered fair by many Greek Catholics because of their dissatisfaction (often well-motivated) with the “pro-Moscow pliability” of the Vatican . It will mean a headlong struggle against Moscow 's pro-imperial ambitions with resolute measures “to put it in its place.” It is about punishing Moscow Orthodoxy for wrongs done by it and not about the evangelical treatment of its diseases. If this statement is correct, such a reaction is too automatic to be a really Christian and ecclesiastical reaction. The same conclusion is implied by what His Beatitude, Lubomyr Cardinal Husar said in an interview with a reporter of the Polish bulletin KAI: “We all have to be like John Paul II, whose ecumenical awareness and patience are exceptional.” 88

The Brest logic of the UGCC (or, in a broader sense, the Kyivan Church) of being a sister-church to the Roman Church, which was so strongly advocated by Patriarch Joseph, seems still to be viewed by the Roman Catholic Church as a very nearly scandalous claim. The title of “sister-church” is mechanically applied to the Eastern Orthodox churches, whereas the Eastern Catholic churches still have to seek consolation in the status of “rite.”

It is clear that such ecclesiology directly affects Vatican diplomacy. When Patriarch Theoktist of the Romanian Orthodox Church, during his recent visit to Rome , joined the celebration organized by the Pope in St. Peter's Square, Vatican officials immediately found “an equally important throne” for him and let him be seated next to John Paul II. This fact was presented by the Vatican press as a positive example of living ecumenism, without considering whether the title of “pope” bears the same honour as that of “patriarch.” If I am not mistaken, not a single Eastern Catholic patriarch was given the same honour, exactly on the ground that “the Pope's title is something more than just the title of patriarch of the West.” I remember when I mentioned other examples of such inconsistency to my Polish colleagues at the 10 th session of the Synod of Bishops in the Vatican , they turned their eyes away saying nothing: in their eyes, it was, apparently, too ambitious to make such unjustified claims.

Of course, Greek Catholics should not concentrate on such inconsistencies and build their ecclesial policy on the basis thereof. I mentioned the throne only in order to signal that the Roman Curia should get rid of the remoteness in its treatment of the Eastern Catholic churches. These churches are a convenient object of argumentation for Orthodoxy not only because they are “uniate” but also because they illustrate the inadequate place prepared for the united Orthodox churches in the present Catholic community.

As I analyse the logic of the struggle of Greek Catholics for the status of patriarchate, I should mention another factor beautifully spotted by an Austrian, Ernst K. Suttner (with respect to the UGCC):

Many Greek Catholics today would like their church, which is in union with Rome , to be elevated to patriarchal status. What in the 17 th century would be seen by their ancestors as a complete overcoming of the schism with the Orthodox is now sought by them exclusively for their confession. 89

The idea of a patriarchate suggested by the Orthodox is not less “separate.” This is a clear indication that Ukrainian Christians have almost lost the ecclesial awareness, which they had in the past. It is clear that neither in the Vatican nor in the Phanar are such nuances considered. However, the chronic inability to establish a united Kyiv-Halych patriarchate should urge Ukrainians to see it not only as someone's political calculation but also as a lesson from the Lord that they keep failing to learn.

It is rather interesting to look closer at the historical proposals of the Kyivan patriarchate.

The idea of the establishment of such a [then] Rusyn [that is to say, Ukrainian] patriarchate appeared at the end of the 16 th century and made itself felt up to the end of the 17 th century. 90

More careful consideration shows that it arose in two forms: on the one hand, as a proposal of the chancellor of the Polish Republic , Jan Zamojski, “about the transfer of the Constantinople capital to Kyiv,” and, on the other hand, as “the establishment of an autonomous Rusyn Patriarchate, which would be in communion both with Rome and Constantinople .” The two readings agreed with each other only in terms of geography, though, in my opinion, they were qualitatively different in essence. The first version of the idea was merely a Polish reflection of the Moscowite idea to replace the Second Rome by the Third Rome. The second version was a solely Kyivan vision of church unification –

…the messianic idea of the Ukrainian Church is an idea, which carries the great providential truth that Rome is the thesis, Constantinople is the antithesis, and Kyiv is the synthesis. 91

The Kyivan Patriarchate is seen here as a “bridge” (or, mediator between Rome and Constantinople , as suggested by Patriarch Lubomyr Husar).

The “ Kyivan Church ” would prefer to return to the situation before the schism, that is to say, to be in communion both with Rome and Constantinople , despite the continuing schism between the Old and New Romes. Then we would have some kind of indirect Eucharistic communion. 92

According to the previously quoted Waclaw Gryniewicz, “the very notion of double loyalty seems lawful and fruitful in the context of the ecclesiology of communion ( koinonia ) of sister-churches.” 93 In this way, what was well known in the earlier days of Ukraine takes clear shape today:

At the turn of the 17 th century, many [representatives] of the church and secular elite of the Polish Republic assumed that two churches which are not in Eucharistic communion with each other may use a third church as a connecting bridge, if that church is in communion with both parties. 94

By the way, this compromise formula was acceptable also for Orthodox Kyivan Metropolitan Petro Mohyla, who believed that it was possible to “be ordained by a patriarch, who is not in union, and still be in agreement with the Roman bishop and church.” 95

Therefore, Ukrainian Christians are challenged with a decisive choice between two possible ways. The first one is the way of separate patriarchates. And I am not ready to call this way unambiguously wrong, as it can be just a preparatory one. It is the feeling that there can be temporary “shelters” on the way to the desired goal that urges me to support the idea of the UGCC patriarchate. However, in this case we have to remember that “incomplete solutions carry the danger of new divisions. The interests of certain churches are given priority over the good of the whole church, which immeasurably complicates the problem of reconciliation and unification.” 96

The other way is by reviving the unifying spirit, which was an organic part of the Kyivan tradition. As Metropolitan Sheptytsky once noted, in this case, “the future unified church would not be either Catholic or Orthodox, in the traditional sense of the words.” 97 Here, we again come across a reflection of the filial character of the Kyivan Church – filial with respect to Rome (Christian West) and Byzantium (Christian East). The fact that Kyivan Christian tradition was formed in the bosom of Byzantium does not contradict the recognition of Rome as the head of the whole Christian family at the time. 98 And, as we know, a daughter is neither the father's nor the mother's but a genetic synthesis of both.

As I side with advocates of the idea of double Eucharistic communion, I am perfectly aware of the fact that both the Vatican and Constantinople are suspicious of it. This guardedness of church pragmatics plays an important and positive role at the present moment of development of the Kyivan Church , as it prevents the strategists of double communion from being carried away by unjustified illusions. However, the “sober” practicality of sceptics, in its turn, should not ignore what is probably undeveloped but still quite an authentic reality. That is to say, they should not suppress the natural ecclesial presentiments of the Kyivan Church . The biblical logic of the rejected cornerstone (comp. Mat. 21:42 ) has proven right too often in the history of the universal Church for Rome or Constantinople to allow themselves to fall into the sin of insensitivity again now. Therefore, instead of rejecting the mentioned ecclesial presentiment, Rome and Constantinople might help the theologians of the Kyivan tradition to put this idea into an appropriate form. This will help to make it serve the cause of reconciliation and to emphasize the intrinsic essence of the Catholic and Orthodox identities, which have been mutually exclusive so far. For, as Dr. Myron Bendyk said, “it is much easier to reach Catholic-Orthodox unity within one particular church (the Kyivan) than between different particular churches (Roman and Constantinopolitan).” 99

However, the formula of double communion, that is the simultaneous Eucharistic communion with both the Roman Pontiff and the Patriarch of Constantinople, can also be only a partial solution to the problem under the conditions of present-day Ukraine (and not that of past Ukraine ) as the Moscow-oriented branch of the historic Church of Kyiv would be thrown “overboard.” That is to say, if one knows the history of Ukraine , it is safe to predict that any attempts to solve its ecclesial “squaring the circle” by eliminating the interests of one of the three mentioned centres of Christianity are doomed to failure.

Therefore, only cooperation between Rome , Constantinople , Moscow , and all (canonical and non-canonical) churches of the Kyivan tradition will provide a really harmonious and long-term solution to the Ukrainian problem. In other words, as was already said, neither of the mentioned centres can bring Christian peace to this land on its own. In terms of the above-mentioned patriarchal models, this means (as an ideal formula for the future) joint recognition by all three historic centres of Christianity of a single Kyivan Patriarchate (united Church of Kyiv), which would be in double Eucharistic communion with Catholicism and Orthodoxy (through the core of the present UGCC – with Rome, through the core of the present UOC-KP and UAOC – with Constantinople, and through the core of the present UOC – with Moscow. See Chart 1.)

I realize that such a simultaneous, triple recognition of one patriarchate still looks like an absolute ecclesial science fiction. However, out of curiosity, I would like to suggest a mental exercise in order to identify arguments in favour of such solution.

А) Moscow 's recognition of such a patriarchate would remove barriers in the way of recognition thereof by Constantinople . Constantinople would regain its due honours as mother-church and establish prayerful unity with the most numerous church of the Slavic territories. In addition, Constantinople and Moscow would find an honourable solution to “the discord regarding Ukrainian uniatism.”

B) Moscow would find also an honourable solution to “the discord regarding Ukrainian Autocephaly,” preserving its prayerful unity with Kyiv and having no hostile churches on its southern borders as a result. Thus, by “releasing” the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (in unity with the Moscow patriarchate by now), Moscow would not only preserve canonical connection with it through the Kyivan Patriarchate but would also gain the honour of being remembered in prayer by three other fragment-churches which had been hostile to it before. In addition, the recognition of the Kyivan Patriarchate would allow tolerant existence on the whole territory of Ukraine for those UOC parishes which would prefer to function in the status of the Russian Orthodox Church within the framework of Moscow Patriarchate. That is the way the Roman Catholic Church functions in Ukraine today.

C) Rome would find an honourable solution to the problem of the need to bless the patriarchate of its faithful church without exposing itself to the risk of a reproach from the Orthodox. It would also have an opportunity to satisfy those Roman Catholics who are trying to persuade the Pope to “release” the Uniates, who “only cause trouble for the Pope,” and to do this without losing prayerful unity with them. Their loyalty to the Roman See cost Greek Catholics too much blood and suffering to be now disregarded either by Rome or anybody in Ukraine . Finally, Rome (as well as Moscow ) would additionally gain mention in prayer from three other fragment churches, which have been hostile to it so far. At the same time, it would preserve its Eucharistic connection with its “representative.”

D) All the Ukrainian churches would get real benefits from such an agreement, as it would stop the hostility which is exhausting their strength and reducing their competitiveness as compared with the missionary activities of other churches or religious groups. If all the Ukrainian churches of the Kyivan tradition joined a single patriarchate, they would have a real opportunity to turn the vectors of their orientation to a mutual centre and bring to the altar of ancient Kyiv all good blessings gained from Roman, Byzantine and Muscovite spirituality instead of bringing a hydra of discord.

E) And, most importantly, the establishment of such a patriarchate would provide the “church laboratory” mentioned by John Paul II for the world ecumenical movement. In the beginning, the power lines of understanding and peace would go exactly through Kyiv. It would be used to try out the sincerity and mutual trust of all three centres. Thus, a unified Kyivan Patriarchate might become a stabilizing factor and a field for direct cooperation of the centres, which are not yet in direct Eucharistic communion with each other.

This would be an important step towards replacing the old model of unification of churches based on the principle of ecclesial imperialism with the model of Eucharistic communion of churches. The former “stumbling blocks in the way to ecumenism” may play a determining role in the formation of the latter. “The mission of the Eastern Catholic churches is to persuade the churches of the East and West that the return to the model of Eucharistic communion is the only way to restore church unity.” 100

Sober realists will, undoubtedly, ask a basic question: “From where will Ukrainians draw the spiritual energy needed for a complete transformation of their souls, which are currently burdened with hostility and distrust?” That is where we can recall what an amazing enthusiasm filled the hearts of Ukrainian Christians (primarily Greek and Roman Catholics, of course, though not only them) during the visit of John Paul II to Ukraine in 2001. Even refined Vatican sceptics were amazed by that enthusiasm. One can just imagine how Ukrainian souls would be moved by a simultaneous and joint pilgrimage of both the Roman Pope and the patriarchs of Constantinople and Moscow to Ukraine in order to jointly proclaim a unified Kyivan Patriarchate! Not only Ukrainian souls would be transformed, but it is impossible to even fathom the spiritual wonder that all Christians of good will would experience throughout the world at such an event.

My conviction of the energy of the proposed model is based on another, this time solely theological, intuition. In view of the fact that the division of the autocephalous part of Ukrainian churches into UOC-KP and UAOC is due not to ecclesial motivations but solely based on questions of personnel, and that these churches actually jointly constitute one element of the triad, the proposed model (see Chart 1) assumes the familiar form of the “infusibility and inseparability” of three substances, which are typical of the existence of the Holy Trinity. If the Ad Gentes statement (n. 7) is fair about the Trinity as God's eternal plan of salvation for all people, which becomes visible through the act of sending the Son and the Holy Spirit into the world, the mentioned proposal is in line with this plan and, therefore, is capable of awakening the lulled spiritual strength of the people.

Ukrainian Churches of the Kievan Tradition

Chart 1.

Of course, I can hardly believe that my version of I have a dream 101 will be immediately taken up by all ecclesiologists worldwide after they have become acquainted with it. Therefore, I would be happy if, as a practical result of this mental exercise, one would get the feeling that non-standard ecclesiological (and at the same time ecumenical) solutions to the Ukrainian situation can and should be found.