Chapter 3, 3.1-3.4

Chapter 3. The Dynamic of Geo-Christian 51 Processes and the Ukrainian Churches.

3.1. Civilization's Challenge to Churches of Slavic Areas.

Taking a closer look at the process of ecumenical convergence of the three branches of Christianity in the 20 th century, one can see that it was mostly characterized by alternating challenges, which the branches had to answer in turn.

The first Protestant ecumenical initiatives at the turn of the 20th century were addressed directly to Protestant partners, but indirectly constituted a challenge to all Christians throughout the world. In 1920, after the Patriarchate of Constantinople joined the ecumenical process, and especially after the World Council of Churches was established in 1948, a certain Protestant-Orthodox pressure zone was formed with respect to the Roman Catholic Church, which viewed the ecumenical movement as a violation of its ecclesial foundations at that time:

Catholics should not join such attempts, or support them, as, otherwise, they will promote the spread of pseudo-Christian religion, which is a thousand miles away from the true Church of Christ (Pope Pius XII). 52

The Kremlin felt the challenging character of that moment for Rome . It has been argued that the aim of the Moscow Patriarchate in joining the World Council of Churches was to also weaken its ancient competitor.

In the 1960s, as was already mentioned, Catholicism not only accepted the challenge, but also answered it in a fitting manner by seizing the leadership initiative. This had a revolutionizing effect on the whole of Western Europe where both Catholic and Protestant Christians became increasingly united in a single “front” from that time on. In a few decades, the change became tangible in the World Council of Churches. As far as their methodological approaches to solving many geo-Christian problems are concerned, Protestants have seemingly much more in common with the Roman Catholic Church, which only has observer status in the Council, than they do with the Orthodox churches, which are full members thereof. The Pan-Orthodox Meeting in Salonica (1998) heralded the beginning of the rebalance of Protestant-Orthodox partnership. The alliance axis “Protestantism-Orthodoxy,” which challenged Catholicism, has been increasingly on the decline, whereas the Western axis “Catholicism-Protestantism,” which is better motivated in the cultural sense and currently challenges Eastern Orthodoxy, is becoming stronger.

I can understand how joyfully some Orthodox isolationist's heart will leap at this conclusion . They will say : “There you have it!” Confirmation of the Catholic-Protestant conspiracy against Orthodoxy continually reported by isolationists' sources! However, where an isolationist sees a conspiracy and proselytism, I see a cultural challenge that, Patriarch Athenagoras believed, “hinders the ritualistic and psychological rigidity” of Orthodoxy and aids the challenged object in correcting its position. 53 Today, both Catholics and Protestants put, so to say, cultural pressure on the Orthodox (Eastern Christian) branch of Christianity with a determined demand not to let it “ become petrified outside history ” and with a desire to help it get out of permanent anachronism and acclimatize itself to the parameters of the modern world.

Of course, one cannot deny the fact that most interchurch initiatives are mixed with the purely earthly, pragmatic interests of one party or another. However, it does not follow from this that such initiatives are totally deprived of a providential sense and that there is no will of the Holy Spirit in them. For example, before the 1960s, Catholicism of the time may have looked like the most reactionary and retrograde force to many Protestants and Orthodox. However, Catholicism managed to get out of that box with flying colours, having not only kept, but even developed and enriched its Catholic identity. Now, let us ask ourselves: was the grace of the Holy Spirit not at work in that Protestant-Orthodox “conspiracy”? Why then should one see only a dark side in a Catholic-Protestant challenge? What is there to stop the Eastern churches from mobilizing their theological resources and presenting a truly Eastern Orthodox vision of the modern world's controversies and problems instead of simply complaining and indulging in self-isolation?

Mobilization of the positive efforts of the Eastern churches is needed also in order to prevent the one-sidedness of pressure from the West. For the East also has its civilizational mission – to paraphrase Athenagoras: “to prevent the West from dissolving in history.” It is an illusion to think that the cultural and globalizing pressures from the Western churches are unstoppable and that the Christian East has no future. This results from the fact that the East itself desperately clings to the past, taking its backwardness for authenticity and rejecting the challenge sent by God to all mankind. A constructive response from the East is badly needed for its future. And to make the East get out of its sweet liturgical drowsiness, it is necessary to justify the pressure from the West, which becomes really salvific for the East.

However, the cultural pressure put on the Eastern churches by the churches of the West is not the only geo-Christian phenomenon of modern life. At the Pan-Orthodox meeting in Salonica , Greece , in 1999, Orthodoxy still appeared as a more or less monolithic force, whereas the beginning of the new century brings considerable changes into this picture as it activates the old confrontation between the second and third Romes. Thus, the third “collision” of civilizations (according to the classification of Toynbee 54), the Muscovite and Byzantine, becomes more distinct in the modern church history of Ukraine . As expected, Constantinople 's recognition of the Estonian Orthodox Church as a church outside the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate was only a prelude to similar (though unfinished) efforts of Constantinople with regard to the recognition of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly.

Thus, it appears that the entire Christian world has today gathered around the whole Eastern Christian Slavic territory in order to make it venture on a qualitative transformation and reorganization and to express its important opinion. Without the normalization of interchurch relations in this territory, it will not only be impossible to find a way out of the ecumenical deadlock, but, also, the whole body of interchurch relations will continue to be in a feverish condition.

3.2. Discussion of the Ukrainian Identity and Its Impact on the Ecumenical Prospects in Ukraine .

The religious consciousness of the Ukrainian people still does not provide for a vision of Ukraine as the meeting point of the three main branches of Christianity, Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism. The role of Orthodoxy in the formation of the religious awareness of Ukrainians is obvious, whereas the role of Catholicism and Protestantism is, sometimes, diminished. The influence of these two branches of Christianity is sometimes interpreted as the result of an invasive and insidious proselytism. In this case, the ideal situation is seen in “clearing” their land of foreign (that is to say, harmful) influences. While confirming well-known facts of proselytism in the past, one should note, however, that this position is a reflection of the Third-Rome confessional identity, since it was Third Rome that assumed the responsibilities of the “protector of the purity of Orthodoxy.” What is viewed by Moscow as the expansion of Catholicism and Protestantism on the Ukrainian territory is for the modern Ukraine a resumption of the presence of the three branches of Christianity, which was traditional for it. 55

The prospects of Christian understanding in Ukraine strongly depend on proper self-identification of people. Comparison between the Ukrainian and Russian Christian identities is of key importance in this regard since the religious awareness of modern Ukrainians was formed in the dominating field of Russian Orthodoxy for a long period of time. As they existed for centuries under the dominant influence of Russian Orthodoxy, which uprooted the national and religious originality of Ukrainians with special attention, the Christian traditions in Ukraine were bound to be distorted. To prove this, let us use the opinion of a well-known non-Ukrainian expert, Ernst Christoph Suttner:

Any originality of the former Kyivan Metropolitanate had to disappear. Hierarchs and theologians from Kyiv were only to help the Russian Church become open to Europe . But in all other respects, the Kyivan Church had to adjust its spiritual, liturgical and theological life to the pattern of Moscow and, later, St. Petersburg . 56

By affirming the fact of such deformation of the religious worldview of Ukrainians, I do not, by any means, intend to reject the natural character of the process of inter-influences between the two neighbouring churches. (There was a period when the Moscow Church was significantly influenced by the Church of Kyiv .) However, there is a big difference between the natural influences of Russian Orthodoxy which will remain for a long time or even forever, and the forced “trimming” of Kyivan piety to fit the “only true” Russian matrix.

Today, everyone in Ukraine notes the erosion of self-identification of Ukrainian Christians who seemed to have been distinct until recently. This is a subject of discussion today: whether this erosion is a stimulus for the restoration of the recently lost identity of the Moscow pattern. Or, on the contrary, whether this is the first step toward the development of a new form of that which was old and long-forgotten (to the degree that anything new is a comeback).

The Moscow Christian tradition whose Metropolitanate autocephaly was legalized in 1458 is post -schism and, by the logic of its existence, anti- Catholic. The Third Rome considered itself the protector of Orthodoxy . At that time, this term meant it was “taking up the baton,” continuing the feud in which the second Rome was involved with the first Rome prior to the Turkish invasion. 57 Therefore, what to Kyiv was the “openness” of the church to other churches of the Christian oecumene, including the Catholic Church, looked to Moscow like “betrayal” of and contamination of Orthodoxy with the Uniate heresy.

This difference in self-identification assumes a special importance today, in the age of ecumenism when the Christian community, in general, welcomes the movement of churches towards each other and towards Christian reconciliation. In spite of the unacceptability of “uniatism” as a historical method (or, maybe, owing to it), the idea of reconciliation between Orthodoxy and Catholicism becomes increasingly attractive. Thus, the Kyivan tradition of openness to the centres of Orthodoxy and Catholicism (and, in modern times, we need to consider openness to Protestantism as well) not only assumes legitimacy in the modern world but also becomes ecumenically more promising than the anti-Catholic antagonism still typical of the Moscow Church . The development of this openness would allow not only the harmonizing of religious interests inside Ukraine but it would also have a positive effect on East-West relations in general by demonstrating the advantages of openness over isolationism.

3.3. The Church of Moscow Versus the Church of Kyiv , or the Problem of “Nationalism.”

As was already mentioned in the first chapter, the main conflicts of the Slavic ecclesial space can be found along the lines of (1) the Catholic-Orthodox divide and (2) the Moscow-Byzantium rivalry (the issue of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly). Rejecting the ecclesial nature of the UGCC, UAOC and UOC-KP, the Moscow Patriarchate traditionally sees the “heresy of ethnophiletism” 58and nationalism as the bases of their ecclesiology and church mentality. In addition, the tendency to nationalism is often referred to as the reason why the international Christian community is slow to establish full contacts with these churches, as well. It is believed that this tendency is expressed, among other things, in the anti-Moscow orientation of the “national” churches, the negative character of which makes a negative impression on Western Christians. Let us have a closer look at this argument.

On the one hand, Archimandrite Rafail (Karelin) is right when he says that, “the Church is not national but supranational.” 59 That is exactly how the faithful of the Moscow Patriarchate justify the idea that Ukrainians have no need to establish their own national church but that they should continue going to the Russian Church instead. On the other hand, however, according to the oral testimony of Archbishop Augustin (Markevych) of the same Ukrainian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, attempts to introduce the Ukrainian language in the Liturgy roused much opposition among ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking population in Ukraine who threatened to seek direct government intervention from Moscow . Therefore, not only the Ukrainian but also the Russian church mentality has a national character. The only difference between them is that pro-Russian Christians seek to preserve the status quo [from the Soviet era] whereas the pro-Ukrainian Christians seek to change it.

One cannot, in fact, deny that the faithful, the clergy, and even some hierarchs of some Ukrainian churches (of the Byzantine rite) use national-protective rhetoric, unambiguously interpreted by the West as nationalistic. Due to the wrongs done to the UGCC and UAOC by communist Moscow , the faithful of these churches, almost unanimously, support the state independence of Ukraine . In general, the long period of persecutions developed in their souls, in certain cases, negative feelings that can hardly be described as truly Christian. Therefore, strengthening the evangelical motivation in the attitude of the faithful is a priority and urgent task for these churches.

At the same time, the fear of some Western Christians of any combination of Christianity with culture is, very often, too sketchy and superficial. If we follow this logic, we would end up having to accuse even Jesus of a wrong understanding of Christian universalism. For he said: “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the House of Israel” (Mt. 15, 24). The authenticity of Christianity should not be seen only in the absence of any mention of anything national. The Christian “distillate” is not closer to Christian teaching than the living water of faith enriched with national “minerals”. As for the UGCC, starting from the middle 19 th century, it increasingly felt the missionary character of its ministry with regard to Ukrainians. That ministry could be characterized by a paraphrase of the Gospel: “We were sent only to the lost sheep of the House of Ukraine.” (Comp. Mt. 15, 24). The word “lost” is a determinative here, as it directly refers us to the words of Christ: “Suppose one of you has a hundred sheep and loses one of them. Does he not leave the ninety nine in the open country and go after the lost sheep until he finds it?” The evangelical “sheep” of Ukraine were lost in the ideological jungles, confused by cunning promises, and bled white in the thorns of the GULAG. Therefore, the national character of church mission can be seen, from certain perspective, as a direct embodiment of the evangelical spirit and not a distortion thereof! (Of course, by this I do not intend to justify the abandonment of the evangelical nature of the Christian faith, turning the church into an instrument of a political and ideological conjuncture.)

One can also give more practical warnings against hasty accusations of nationalism. It is methodologically wrong to condemn the consequences without looking at the cause. The negative attitude to Moscow has no confessional complexion, as both Greek Catholics and Orthodox of the autocephalous orientation possess it. This is an expression of a kind of historical retribution for the collaborationism of the Russian Orthodox Church with the communist regime, which brought numerous troubles to Ukraine . Even if such sentiments are to be viewed as unambiguously “nationalistic,” they should not be considered out of context, without taking into account the openly negative attitude of the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate to the state independence of Ukraine, its rejection of the UGCC's ecclesial nature, and its more than evasive attitude to the issue of Ukrainian autocephaly.

In addition, it is obvious, that the anti-Muscovite orientation of Greek Catholics is due to the historical injustice of the Lviv pseudo-sobor – the injustice, which is recognized even by objective Western historians. Let us give a floor to the same Austrian expert:

That process, which was a degradation of human rights, was officially called by the authorities “the return to the mother-church, the Moscow Patriarchate.” This definition was untruthful in its essence, and the whole process was criminal. The native lands of these faithful belonged to the Western world from the time of the disintegration of Kyivan Rus, and, therefore, they were never linked to Moscow in terms of church and state. The “return to Moscow” arguments are a propagandistic falsification of historical facts, and the people to whom it was referred simply could not return to Moscow, as neither they themselves nor their ancestors ever belonged to it, and neither did they want to become part of it at that time, as they were nationally-conscious Ukrainians and knew very well that those who belong to the Russian Church will be inevitably russified. 60

The propaganda efforts of Moscow are aimed at taking advantage of the general European opposition to nationalist doctrines in order to present Ukrainian national churches as solely nationalistic churches opposing “universal, superethnical” Russian Orthodoxy. At least, two comments should be made with regards to the statement.

To start with, the very claim for universality appears doubtful. For in Russia the Russian Orthodox Church is openly called “the Church of the Russian people.” The rhetoric of ethnocentricity is so common here that even the highest hierarch of the ROC does not notice typical contradictions to the declared principal of universality. Let me give only one, but a very typical, example. The Russian scholar Andrei Zubov has noted that:

In the whole lengthy report read on 29 December 1994 in the Russian Academy of Education and called “Foundations of Orthodox education in Russia,” His Beatitude the Patriarch [Alexis II] emphasized the indissoluble ties of the Russian people with Orthodoxy more than once, but did not even mention the fact that he was the patriarch of not only Russians, but also Jakutians, Ukrainians, Chechens, Tatars, Mordva, Armenians, Germans, Jews, Calmics and other ethnic groups in Russia. 61

Therefore, in the opinion of both Greek Catholics and Autocephalous Orthodox, the visible dilemma between “nationalism” and “universalism” conceals the deepest gist of the problem, namely: an effort to keep the Kyivan church in the shade, as has been done for more than three centuries 62, that is to say, the attempt of one national church to prevent the revival of another national church.

It should be mentioned that patriarchal Moscow 's fear of the revival and unification of the Church of Kyiv is not really without foundation. As of 1 January 2003, the Moscow Patriarchate has about 10,600 communities 63within the whole territory of the Russian Federation, whereas in Ukraine alone, as of 1 January 2004, it has “control” over 10,300 communities. However, if it came to a unification of all Orthodox communities in Ukraine (i.e. the three major jurisdictions mentioned above), they together would total 15,150, which is more than Russia has now. Further extrapolation from the unification prospects and summation of absolutely all today's active branches of the Kyivan church in Ukraine (including Greek Catholics) would give a total figure of some 18,500 communities.

Both in the second and third case, the unified Church of Kyiv would become the largest Church of the Christian East. This would substantially undermine the Third Rome's claims to the position of the Second Rome. That is why the accusations of nationalism against the Ukrainian churches and efforts to prevent the legitimization of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly become sine qua non for the domination of the Moscow Patriarchate. 64

Nonetheless, one should distinguish between the negative role of nationalism, which damages the evangelical nature of the Christian Church by overemphasizing political factors (and signs of this illness are surely present in the “national” Ukrainian churches,) and the positive role of the awareness and realization of a people's own religious identity. This is especially important for the Eastern churches, which, by their tradition, are more closely tied to ethnicity than the Western churches.

The second comment deals with the fact that the argument about the “nationalistic” nature of the Ukrainian churches is accepted by Western Christians almost automatically. The reason for this is not only the respective rhetoric of the clergy of the “national” churches. Sometimes it appears that religious processes in the West and East of Europe are out of phase with each other. In the postwar period, members of Western European societies (including Christians) made much effort to overcome nationalistic tendencies and create an atmosphere of peace and cooperation. Therefore, the Western vector of development is characterised by mutual convergence , partnership, overcoming differences and avoiding all possible obstacles in the way of unity. Therefore, it is difficult for Western Christians to understand why in Ukraine, at first sight, a qualitatively different process is under way, namely the efforts of Ukrainian Christians to realize their own religious identity and distinguish it from the Russian one. 65 This can be understood as the vector of efforts of a substantial part of Ukrainian Christians as characterized by the separation from the church body which oppressed Ukrainian religious traditions and national forms of religious self-determination. In order to make certain of their identity, Ukrainians have to draw a dividing line between “us” and “them” and concentrate on what makes them different from others, that is, to do exactly what is so disapproved of in the West today.

Does this mean that Ukrainian Christians are not capable of adopting modern European values? One may be inclined to come to this conclusion if one does not look into the causes of the described contradiction. Is the assumed “universalism” of Moscow Orthodoxy, which conceals aspirations to maintain the unfair status quo , really closer and more acceptable to Western Europe than the efforts of Ukrainian Christians to break free from what they see as ecclesiastical imperialism? In this case, then, the “nationalistic” overtones of the weaker party, which suffered persecutions, may seem to more dangerous for the Christian oecumene than the definitely pan-Slavic and pan-Russist overtones of Russian Orthodoxy, which, allegedly, are free of nationalism.

Such an aberration of vision is usually due to the fact that, for example, in the 1960s or ‘70s, there was peace and tranquility in the territories controlled by the Moscow Patriarchate, whereas the 1990s, when the so-called “national” churches of Ukraine revived, brought interconfessional frictions and conflicts. But was that peace and tranquility really Christian, and did the attempts of Ukrainian churches to find a place for themselves under the Christian sun really warrant condemnation? Was not the illusory peace of that time farther from the expected ecumenical ideal than the attempts at seeking a more just status quo ? Monica Hellwig noted that “sometimes the evasion of change is more dangerous than a response to challenges, even if it results in conflicts.” 66

Therefore, both Western and Ukrainian Christians have specific tasks to do. People in the West often do not understand the dynamic of the struggle of Ukrainians for the right to revive their Christian reputation. But it does not follow from this that the very desire of Western Christians to urge Ukrainians to rise above all barriers is wrong in itself. The outstanding representative of Western Christianity, His Holiness Pope John Paul II, showed Ukrainians a striking example of the meticulous application of Christian principles. In his speeches in Ukraine, he never mentioned anything about the neo-imperial sentiments of the Kremlin. He elevated the importance of the state independence of Ukraine to a high position without even trying to stir up anti-Russian sentiments. (Ironically, some Ukrainian church leaders invoke anti-Russian sentiment to promote their own position, only to harm their cause.) The Ukrainian people felt that, in the eyes of the Pope, they have value in themselves and not just as a “springboard” for winning over the proud Muscovite hearts. And the spiritual greatness of such a peace-making and un-hostile position had an unstoppable and healing effect. Ukraine still has a long way to go to develop this ability to speak about one's own tasks without making it conditional on the other party's position.

However, while expecting Ukrainian Christians to comply with the main principles of their faith and to love those who reject even their right to have their own churches, Western Christians (in a broader sense, Christians worldwide) cannot leave unnoticed the very fact of the existence of those who revile Ukrainians and their legitimate aspirations to worship in their own tradition. Or to be more exact, the latter cannot be considered better Christians and viewed as the only ones good enough to enter the ecumenical dialogue. Otherwise, the “dialogue of love” will become just an ostentatious cloak concealing the solely political logic of “yielding to power.” What is absolutely appropriate for rivalry between political parties becomes destructive for the Christian nature of ecumenism if applied to interchurch relations.

Let us sum up: in the 20 th century and, especially, at the turn of the millennium, the tendency towards a revival of the Kyivan Church was too obvious to be unnoticed. Besides that, the share in the historic responsibility of the global centers of Christianity for the schism of that church in the 16 th century has surely also been established enough to incline them to show more initiative today regarding Ukrainian church matters. The following chapters will deal with the specificities of the Ukrainian policy of the above-mentioned centres as they are seen or should be seen by Kyiv-oriented Christians.

3.4. The Role of Rome in the Formation of the Modern Christian Image of Ukraine.

Rome exercises its influence on relations between the Ukrainian churches of the Kyivan tradition mainly through the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). During the time of its existence, the UGCC has paid a high price for its loyalty to the Roman Apostolic See. The beatification of 25 new martyrs of the church is just the top of the striking martyrology by which the church showed how important communion with Rome is for Ukraine. The “Conception of the Ecumenical Position of the UGCC” says:

The UGCC's communion with the Church of Rome has served it as a great historic support, enriched its ecclesiological experience, and filled it with spiritual blessings which have inspired its faithful to great sacrifice and great deeds of heroic faith during persecutions. Ecclesial unity with the universal pontiff became one of the basic foundations for the identity of the UGCC, and, therefore, any further ecumenical steps cannot undermine the significance of this unity and should be made taking this unity into account (p. 17). 67

The ecclesial awareness of the UGCC typically presents its role in ecumenical relations as that of a “mediator.” However, more than one Greek Catholic scholar has noted bitterly that, in reality, even Rome was not interested in this mediation (not to mention Constantinople and Moscow). In the history of the Church, Rome was convinced of the “self-sufficiency, universality and infallibility of the Western Catholic approach” 68 for too long to get rid of that feeling in its approach to interchurch relations so easily. Amazingly, much was done at the Second Vatican Council and in later teachings of the popes but there still remain certain gaps of seeming ambiguity at the theoretical level. For example, the issue of papal primacy, the ecclesiology of sister-churches and the place of Eastern Catholic churches in the Catholic community all need discussion by theologians and ecclesiologists within the Catholic Church. There exists also the old tradition of leaving unnoticed the vision offered (if perhaps candidly on occasion) by the Eastern Catholic churches themselves.

Thus, the history of the Union of Brest sounds like a definite reproach to Rome :

The fact that Union of Brest was concluded according to ideas which did not accord with the Eastern tradition and that the proposal to reach agreement through the establishment of a Kyivan Patriarchate was not heard in Rome either, resulted in tragic consequences in the Polish-Lithuanian state: the rise of two rival churches of Byzantine tradition at the turn of the 17 th century. 69

The schism of one particular church (or, later, several churches) was not the only consequence of that ecclesial “short-sightedness” of the day. The ecclesial experience and peace-making proposals of the Kyivan Church , which actually had great ecumenical potential were darkened.

The Kyivan bishops brought to Rome a very early-Christian model of sister-churches, a model that showed some continuity from as early as in the 11 th century. 70 However, Rome , relying on the power principle, rejected that ecclesiology as “heretical” ( redeant unde discesserunt – “let them return to where they came from”) and forced Kyiv to accept the model of uniatism. Melkite Metropolitan Elias Zogby, is convinced that the “superiority of the Latin rite ( praestantia ritus latini ) was the main cause of the elimination of the theology of sister-churches. 71 In the second half of the 20 th century, the renewed Rome made a definite evolutionary shift towards the sister-churches ecclesiology and, in Balamand, renounced the model of uniatism (and this is fine). However, the merits and honours are Rome 's again, if one can put it so, and the “uniate” Church of the Kyivan tradition continues to be very nearly “heretical” and “anomalous,” as it is once again inconsistent with the patterns of Roman diplomacy.

Here, we can again see the same lack of interest of Rome in any serious study and adoption of the experience of its Eastern Catholic partner. In particular, the experience and ecclesial vision of the UGCC's Patriarch Joseph Slipyj, who was able “to subtly distinguish between a dialogical exchange of values and a non-critical syncretism, or between union and uniatism,” 72 are still kept on the shelf in the curial offices of the Vatican or in the offices of Western theologians without being used. It was probably this Rome 's inert disinterest in any serious consideration of the ecclesial perspectives of Kyivan Christian tradition (though Rome 's attitude to its cultural and historic achievements is mostly very favourable) that urged Fr. Myron Bendyk to formulate his important conclusion: “The UGCC should … offer medicine to the Western churches to heal the psychology of self-sufficiency.” 73

One can see at least two more important ecclesial elements in Bendyk's position.

First , at the level of practical stereotypes (sometimes not even noticeable to Roman Catholics) Catholicism still

identifies itself with the Latin Church, which is its norm. Accordingly, the Eastern Catholic church is an anomaly of the Catholic Church, because it is Eastern… A definite theological fiction prevails again and, therefore, the movement towards unity is not real but fictitious. 74

Two different concepts of what is the nature of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church exist at the present time among Roman and Greek Catholics. The former normally hold to the concept of “one Catholic church – two rites”. In this case, the basic Latin ecclesial formula cum Petro et sub Petro (literally, with Peter and under Peter , where the “sub” is understood as at least some form of administrative subordination) is automatically spread to the Eastern Catholic Church too. Some Ukrainian Greek Catholics, especially those who were greatly traumatized by the forceful subordination of the Church to the Moscow Patriarchate, share this view. A larger portion of Ukrainian Greek Catholics carry the memory of the Kyivan Church as an Eastern Church who entered into Eucharistic unity ( soprychastia ) with the Roman Pontiff. In this case, only part of the Latin ecclesial formula is valid for an Eastern Church, namely cum Petro , and the Latin Church and Eastern Catholic Churches altogether belong to the universal Church. A Pope is, then, the highest authority in matters of faith (the Supreme Pontiff) leaving an Eastern Church administration in the hands of a Synod of its Bishops and/or a Head (Patriarch) of an Eastern Church. In the Greek Catholic perspective, such a vision does not mean higher ambitions of an Eastern Church or betrayal of Catholicity. It is an important ecumenical proposal, which enables Eastern Catholic Churches to fulfil their main task – “to prepare a place for Eastern Orthodox Churches in the united Church” (Maximus IV).

Second, the Ukrainian theologian sees the very problem of ecumenism from a radically different point of view:

Today, the Church carries out its ecumenical search … through meetings of representatives of the main centres of Christianity. That is to say, the vision of church only as Rome , Constantinople or Moscow prevails. Ecumenism at the level of particular churches, for example the Ukrainian or German, when representatives of a divided people gather to negotiate, is not even considered today. However, the problem of church divisions varies from particular church to particular church. 75

Ecumenism at the level of particular churches makes each church an equal subject of the ecumenical process and also provides a radically different basis for an increasingly huge role of the papal ministry. The Pope's role in the model of “ecumenism of particular churches” would be that of the universal bishop, whereas today he acts mainly as the patriarch of the West. The pilgrimage of the present Pope, John Paul II, to Ukraine and other regions with a predominantly Orthodox orientation, has vividly demonstrated this possibility.

While formulating all these obstacles found in the ecumenical approaches of Rome , I have no intention whatsoever of suggesting to the reader that there is any ill will regarding this in the modern Latin Church. There is much more mere ignorance, inertness of established stereotypes and psychological comfort in these obstacles than any deliberate ill will. For me, personally, it became evidently clear at the sessions of the Tenth Assembly of the Synod of Catholic Bishops, where the above-mentioned issue was raised in two aspects. On the one hand, there is a really pronounced need for a more thorough study of the experience of the churches of the East by Western Christians as the first and inevitable step towards understanding the importance of solutions proposed by the Christian East. On the other hand, the Eastern churches, in my opinion, should, for their part, stop complaining about their church reality being ignored and should “roll up their sleeves” and get down to serious theological work on the issue of the place and full value participation of the Eastern churches in the Universal Church.

…It is necessary to review many polemical theological formulations that imply that there are radical differences in principle between the Eastern and Western churches. The Kyivan tradition in the Universal Church always maintained that there was no radical difference between them. 76

The history of the Vatican 's ostpolitik is rich in examples of the humiliation of the UGCC,… examples of its representatives being delicately pushed “under the bench” when Moscow bishops entered the main halls. The overwhelming majority of Roman Catholic clergy were formed in the conviction that such behaviour is an axiom of interchurch diplomacy. However, these very same decades were the period when the adherants of ostpolitik recovered their sight and became disappointed in the style of diplomacy, which promised them the moon in the beginning. Therefore, the way of rethinking history should not be one-sided, as there are no simple solutions to this problem.

On the one hand, one cannot deny that the way to reconciliation passes through dialogue, and the more irreconcilable the rival, the more attention is needed to engage the person in dialogue. In particular, it includes careful consideration of the opponent's position. However, during the last few decades, the Vatican made the mistake of subordination to the opponent (the perceived readiness of the Vatican to sacrifice the interests of the UGCC was an indication of this). This made the “dialogue of love” look increasingly like a “yielding to power.” On the other hand, it is true that the Vatican 's ostpolitik failed. But it would be wrong to believe that Roman Catholics now have no other option than to adopt the position of the once-ignored Greek Catholics. It is true that Ukrainian Greek Catholics sometimes understood the nature of Moscow 's diplomacy better than curial Italians. However, this does not mean that the negative sentiments of some Greek Catholics should be approved as a norm for inter-confessional dialogue.

Therefore, it would be worthwhile for both parties, adherents of ostpolitik in the Vatican curia and the “irreconcilable” part of Greek Catholics, to examine their consciences. Today, it seems impossible for anyone to fail to see that both parties sustain each other's intransigence rather than persuade each other. Greek Catholics would better concentrate on building up the treasures of church life, filling the hearts of the faithful with the true light of the Gospel and urging them to humble work for the benefit of their neighbours rather than focus on the Vatican 's mistakes. The more authentic the Christian life of the UGCC faithful is, the fewer arguments will be left for those who deny their right to existence.