Chapter 2

Chapter 2. Inter-Church Relations in Ukraine Since 1988/89.

2.1. The Emergence of the Greek Catholic Church from the Underground and its Effect on Ecumenical Processes in Ukraine and the World.

The democratisation of Soviet society during Gorbachev's perestroika clearly showed that the monopoly of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine (especially in the western regions) relied solely on the pressure of the state's repressive machinery. As soon as this pressure weakened, the spontaneous and mass transfer of religious communities to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church started. (The present distribution of religious communities is shown in the Appendix 1. 22) As a result, for example, of the 1237 church buildings that were occupied by the Moscow Patriarchate in the Lviv Region alone in 1990, by 1992 only 8 remained in its possession. 23

At first, the leaders of the interested churches made efforts to take control of these processes. On 5 March 1990 , the Quadrilateral Committee started its work. It consisted of representatives of the Holy See, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Exarchate subject to Moscow . The committee was authorized to put in order the above-mentioned religious transformations. However, in the early 1990s neither Moscow nor the Vatican could imagine how unrealistic it was to expect to stop the processes of reorientation of religious communities. The conditions set forth by the Moscow Patriarchate were unacceptable to the Greek Catholic delegation. Finally, on 15 March, the UGCC delegation refused to participate in the work of the committee. From that time on, the reorientation of faithful and the seizure of church buildings were uncontrolled until a new balance was established between the influences of the three main players: Greek Catholics, Orthodox of autocephalous orientation, and Orthodox under the jurisdiction of Moscow .

a. The crisis of interchurch relations.

The mass transition of the faithful to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was a real surprise for the Orthodox world. This version that it was the people's expression of free will was too disturbing an explanation for the Moscow Patriarchate to accept easily. Therefore, officially accepted explanations included, “proselytism on the part of the Vatican ” and “the forced intervention of the local ‘nationalistic' authorities of western Ukraine .” The revival of the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine and other countries of the former socialist block was the subject of discussions at several bilateral meetings of delegations of the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches (Freising, Germany, 1990, Aricca, Italy, 1991, and, of course, Balamand, Lebanon, 1993). The dissatisfaction of the Orthodox Church was so strong that the Vatican considered it necessary to make considerable concessions in order to preserve the earlier achievements of the ecumenical movement. The participants of the dialogue renounced “uniatism” as a solution with regard to Orthodox-Catholic relations by an agreement signed in Freising. However, this agreement was worded such that it might be considered as retroactive, if necessary; that is, the very existence of the Greek Catholic churches might be questioned. Therefore, after Freising, the “Uniate” churches in their turn protested. In September 1990, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church made public its official statement of disagreement. In particular, the statement emphasized two important aspects:

• “It is unacceptable to decide any church's fate in its absence.”
• “The denial of our [the UGCC's] right to existence as a sister church is [an instance of] moral violence in itself and makes impossible the ‘brotherly cooperation of pastors' encouraged in the statement.” 24

Instead, the Balamand Agreement of 1993 was, from a certain point of view, a refutation of the imprudence of Freising. The agreement laid a reasonable foundation under the old controversy over the phenomenon of the Union . It distinguished “Uniatism” as a method of separate restoration of canonical ties between the Orthodox churches and the Roman See, on the one hand, from the actual historical existence, on the other hand, of the Eastern Catholic (Greek Catholic) churches, which enjoy the right to institutional religious freedom. The Balamand statement specifically says: “As for the Eastern Catholic churches, they have the undeniable right to exist and act according to the spiritual needs of their faithful as part of the Catholic community.” 25

The Balamand Agreement was analysed in the pastoral address of Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivsky “About the Unity of the Holy Churches,” published in Lviv on 7 April 1994 . The address included an analysis of ecumenical progress after the Second Vatican Council, particularly the theory of sister churches, which is extremely important for the UGCC, and formulated tasks for the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church on the basis of the Balamand Agreement. In particular, the address included a call “to abstain from any behaviour which would indicate a lack of respect and, thereby, excite discord or even hatred. There should be respect and tolerance in all things between Christians.” 26 In the person of its patriarch, the Church also called both its “faithful and all Christians to avoid not only violence, in deed or in word, but also anything that could excite disdain for other Christians and be a bad testimony…” 27 The address also dealt with the danger of triumphalism. It was emphasized that “martyrs and confessors are always God's gifts for the whole Church and witnesses of Christ before all people. One must not use this testimony to show disdain for our Christian brethren.” 28

Contacts with the Patriarchate of Constantinople continued for some time after the UGCC came out of the underground. For example, in 1992, with the blessing of the ecumenical Patriarch, the previously mentioned Bishop Vsevolod participated in the Synod of Bishops of the UGCC in Lviv when the UGCC hierarchy once again convened at St. George's Cathedral in Lviv.

The work of the unofficial Kievan Church Study Group is an important page in the history of contacts of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The group includes clergy and theologians of both churches. The first advisory meeting of the Study Group took place on 8-10 August 1992 in Oxford , England . Later meetings were held in Stamford , Connecticut , USA (October 1992) and Ottawa , Ontario , Canada (April 1993). The materials of the study group appeared in the journal Logos , published by the Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky Institute of Eastern Christian Studies at St. Paul 's University in Ottawa . They are extremely important for researching the Patriarchate of Constantinople's attitude towards the history of the Kyivan Church and the present status of the Ukrainian churches.

However, the general cooling of relations between Catholics and Orthodox led to the reduction of contacts between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The restoration of the Greek Catholic Church revived anti-Catholic sentiments among the Ukrainian Orthodox as well. Attempts to transport the Diaspora practice of “Ukrainian ecumenism” to the context of Ukraine were made only in the beginning and were not really successful. The cause of that is obvious: unlike the stable balance in the Diaspora, there was strong competition for the souls of the faithful in Ukraine . The logic of that competition dominated all other church interests for some time.

b) On conflicts between the Christian communities of Halychyna (Galicia)

Specificities of statistics.

As a rule, Greek Catholics are accused of “the destruction of three Orthodox eparchies in the western regions of Ukraine .” 29 Well, it is true that in the early 1990s, the overwhelming part of the Moscow Patriarchate left the region. By 2004, only 209 Orthodox communities associated with the Moscow Patriarchate are active in these regions. (See Appendix 2.) However, not all the residents of Halychyna who left the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate joined the Greek Catholic Church. A considerable number remained Orthodox and changed their jurisdiction to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. However, the fifty-year-long stay of Orthodoxy in Halychyna did leave its imprint here (despite the fact that there were actually no Orthodox here before 1946). According to official information (provided in Appendix 2), as of 1 January 2004 , in Halychyna (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil provinces), the ratio of Orthodox communities (of all three jurisdictions) to Greek Catholic communities is about 1:1.5, which by no means can be called “the destruction of Orthodoxy.” It is yet another proof of the fact that Christians of this area had the chance to freely express their confessional orientation.

The thesis of a “religious war” in western Ukraine , whose victims are the Orthodox communities of the Moscow Patriarchate, is also an exaggeration. In reality, according to information from the National Religious Committee of Ukraine, as of November 2002, there were eight conflicts registered between communities of the UGCC and Moscow Patriarchate in three provinces of western Ukraine . 30 This includes approximately 3.8% of the total number of communities (209) of that patriarchate in the region and less than 0.3 % of the number of UGCC communities (2,946). (Needless-to-say, the fault does not lie solely with the Greek Catholics in all conflicts.) There is no doubt that the pain of even one community should have society's attention. However, the 3.8 % of UOC (Moscow Patriarchate) communities affected by conflicts does not constitute a religious war, as it is often described. In addition, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is in Eucharistic communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, is building new churches in western Ukraine [the same statistics show that, in the 1992-2004 period, the number of the UOC (MP) parishes increased from 8 to 209 in the region]. This, again, is hardly an indication of a religious war.

Forced conversion or religious freedom?

Another equally traditional accusation against Greek Catholics is their presence among the local authorities of Halychyna. However, first , by far, not all towns and villages of Halychyna are under the dominating influence of Greek Catholics. There are areas where the picture is the opposite, that is, where independent Orthodox dominate. If Greek Catholic influence was as seminal as the Moscow Patriarchate suggests, there would be a clear monoconfessional situation in Halychyna. However, this is not confirmed by the statistics provided above.

It should also be taken into account that in 1988, when it became apparent that it was impossible to control the process of religious revival, the authorities began the mass transfer of possession of closed church buildings, which had not been used for intended purposes for some time, to the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, at the beginning of 1988, there were only 578 Orthodox churches in the Lviv Region, whereas in September the same year there were 1200 (so the number of Orthodox churches more than doubled in 9 months). 31 The buildings were transferred to formally and hastily registered Orthodox “groups of twenty” (parish committees), authorized to manage a church building according to state law. This was often done despite the resistance of the local population, which was predominantly Greek Catholic. In that way, more fuel was added to the flame of the inter-confessional “fire” which was about to spread and the responsibility for which was placed solely on Greek Catholics.

Second, interchurch conflicts occur against the background of low awareness of laws and the uprooted Christian culture of the whole population of Ukraine . In many cases, the readiness of state officials to “adjust” the situation in favour of their personal sympathies or preferences comes from an erroneous interpretation of Christian or national duty, and not from direct instructions of the clergy. This may happen with the faithful of any Church of the region, and it correlates with the general lack of rule of law in post-Soviet and post-totalitarian Ukraine .

Third, all conflicting parties motivate their wish to limit the presence of their competitors by the logic of “equal response,” or “parity.” For example, the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, have for a long time been using their influence on the local authorities – for example, in Sevastopol or Kharkiv. In these areas, hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate pressure the civil authorities to prevent the registration of Greek Catholic communities, labelling them “non-traditional”, or the allocation of plots for church buildings for similar reasons. 32 There are also problems regarding discriminatory regulations of Russian legislation, which make the normal functioning of Ukrainian Greek Catholic and Autocephalous Orthodox communities in Russia difficult. On the other hand, when the Lviv City Council, in its turn, refused to allocate a plot for building another church of the UOC (Moscow Patriarchate) 33 on the grounds that Greek Catholic communities in Moscow and Saint Petersburg have no church buildings at all, it argued its position exactly by appealing to the logic of equal response. (By the way, in 2002, the head of the UGCC, Lubomyr Husar, approached the Lviv deputies with an official request to grant permission to the UOC to build another church.)

But if in the 1990s the Christians of Halychyna did have the chance to exercise their religious freedom, and the influence of state factors was not determinant, why then does the Moscow Patriarchate persist in ignoring this? In my opinion, the tremendous blow to its prestige was the most painful reason. To assume that such a large part of its faithful voluntarily left it at the first opportunity would mean admitting that the nearly half-century presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Halychyna, facilitated by Stalin through the Lviv pseudo-sobor of 1946, left in reality no positive imprint in the lives of the people of Halychyna. Such an admission would be unbearable for the pride of the Third Rome.

Responsibility for conflicts.

In reports of the Moscow Patriarchate, the term “Uniates” is used in a generic sense. The reader may get the impression that aggressiveness and quarrelsomeness are intrinsic characteristics of Greek Catholics and are typical of the position of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church as such. Such a vision leaves several aspects of the problem unnoticed.

First, such a black and white picture of conflicts is too polemic to be realistic. Its mirror reflection is the black and white picture presented by materials of the Lay Committee in Defence of the UGCC, where Orthodox are shown to play only a negative role in interchurch conflicts. But the real picture, in my opinion, is the mutual responsibility of Greek Catholic and Orthodox communities of Halychyna for the inter-confessional conflicts of the late 20th century. Ten years of renewed ministry of the churches has proved to be insufficient to revive the culture of understanding and religious tolerance, to teach people to settle in a civilized manner conflicts which are inevitable with such big changes.

Second , we can be assured that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church's hierarchy is not less concerned about the conflicts than the hierarchy of the Orthodox churches, and, in particular, the UOC (Moscow Patriarchate). This is confirmed by the signatures of the hierarchs of both churches under the press release of the bilateral meeting of 3 July 1998 in Vienna mediated by the Catholic Foundation Pro Oriente . During the meeting, both parties “condemned any kind of violence, whether physical or moral, used during the seizure of church buildings to Christians of any confessions as inconsistent with the ideal of Christian life.” 34

Third, careful analysis of inter-confessional conflicts shows that, though having a religious basis, they often have no clear religious causes. Quite often, religious feelings become objects of manipulation on the part of non-church factors, such as various political groups, competing clans, and even human ambitions. A religious background in this case can serve as a convenient shield for one's personal interests, which may be far from religious.

In addition, there are certain specifics from the field of social psychology that should be mentioned here. The main conflicts in Ukraine were conflicts between the branches of the now divided historic Church of Kyiv . The differences in rite and forms of piety between them are minimal. And we know from conflict management: “The closer the relations are, the more bitter the conflict is.” 35

To break the vicious circle.

The Christian way to break the vicious circle in which Ukrainian Christians, mainly of the Kyivan tradition, are trapped is more or less obvious: to ask forgiveness and to forgive. How can we characterize, in this respect, the position of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, allegedly a stumbling block of ecumenism?

In the paragraph 1.4 we have already spoken about the UGCC's proposals to normalize its relations with the Russian Orthodox Church (“we are offering our hand of forgiveness, reconciliation and love to the Russian people and the Moscow Patriarchate.”) We also remember that these proposals were not answered.

At a festal Liturgy on 27 June 2001 in Lviv, before the Pope and over a million believers, the present head of the UGCC, Lubomyr Cardinal Husar, said:

…The history of the past century knew moments of darkness and spiritual tragedy, moments in which most unfortunately certain sons and daughters of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church consciously and voluntarily did evil things to their neighbours, both to their own people and to others. For all of them, in your presence, Most Holy Father, in the name of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, I wish to ask forgiveness from the Lord, the Creator and Father of us all, and also from those whom we, sons and daughters of this church, may have wronged in any way. So that the horrible past may not weigh down upon us, and not poison our life, for our part with all our hearts we forgive those who in any way have wronged us. 36

Once again, there was no positive response from Moscow to this signal. Moreover, in the Orthodox environment, one often hears that the Orthodox have nothing for which to repent.

The statement of Patriarch Lubomyr of 25 November 2002 is of no less ecumenical importance. He says, on behalf of the UGCC, that he “recognizes and respects the right of the Orthodox Christians of Ukraine, particularly the faithful of the Moscow Patriarchate, to invite and receive those persons who they consider to be their spiritual authorities.” He also expresses his readiness to “receive him (the Patriarch of Moscow) as an exalted guest in order to set in motion the process of solving a number of complicated problems of our relations.” 37 Unfortunately, that signal was also left without response.

I am convinced that, if in the middle of perestroika the Moscow Patriarchate had come forth with a sincere admittance of its mistakes of total submission to the godless authorities and the “solution of the Uniate issue” in 1946, which was unworthy of the Christian spirit, the events in Halychyna might have developed in a different way. And even today, an appropriate step on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church could have a positive and transforming effect on the whole spectrum of relations between the two Churches. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Moreover, in March 2003, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Alexis II, clearly stated: “The Russian Orthodox Church does not accept statements which question the canonicity of the Lviv Council and its results. We are convinced that the undeniable tragic character of the circumstances in which the Council was convened do not give grounds to review its results, for not only that time but the whole history of the Union in Ukraine was tragic.” 38For the UGCC, such words signify: “Everything remains unchanged.”

2.2. The Revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and Its Influence on Ecumenical Processes in Ukraine and the World.

Simultaneously with the emergence of the UGCC from the underground, that is, in 1988-1989, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) was also revived. The Lviv Parish of Sts. Peter and Paul was the first one to proclaim the change of its jurisdiction. Since then, Orthodox communities of Halychyna have probably been the biggest support of autocephaly in Ukraine . This church declared itself the successor of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church which was proclaimed in 1918, then “liquidated” by the NKVD in 1930, restored in Nazi-occupied Ukrainian territory in 1942, and which existed in the post-war period only in the Diaspora. The church was headed by the head of the Diaspora branch of the UAOC, Metropolitan Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), who was elevated to the level of patriarch in Ukraine by decision of the 1990 Council-Sobor of the UAOC in Kyiv.

The main stimulus for a part of Ukrainian Orthodox to gain autocephaly is the historical memory of Kyiv as the centre of the Christianisation of Ukraine-Rus (since 988), as well as the residence of the historical Kyiv Metropolitanate for more than three hundred years. (According to many scholars, this Metropolitanate had a de facto autocephalous status, though this is not universally accepted.) In addition, the autocephalous aspirations of Kyiv are based on the fact that it does not recognize the Russian Orthodox Church as its “ Mother Church ,” which is the official claim of the ROC. Autocephalous Orthodox Kyiv considers the Church of Constantinople its Mother Church and seeks recognition from it.

It is interesting to note that in the late 1980s, at the time of reorientation of Christians in western Ukraine , the position of the Moscow Patriarchate towards the process of establishing autocephalous Orthodox communities was quite ambiguous. On the one hand, the autocephalous were officially considered schismatics. On the other hand, Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly was a lesser evil for the Moscow Patriarchate than Greek Catholicism.

Remarkably, similar logic was used also by the Communist authorities that were losing real influence in Halychyna at that time. When it became clear that the local population would inevitably fall away from Russian Orthodoxy, the Communists made efforts, by any means, to initiate the transition of communities to autocephalous status in order to prevent them from turning to the Greek Catholic camp. For the same reason, Orthodox Moscow talked very little about its negative attitude to the autocephalous “schismatics” in the late 1980s. Moreover, in some conflicts with Greek Catholics, the Orthodox of the two orientations formed a united front against Greek Catholics. They considered their differences insubstantial and their mutual opposition untimely. 39 Still, not every autocephalous community appeared as the result of manipulation on the part of the communist authorities. Orthodoxy became a reality for western Ukraine and gained some patriotic sanction as well.

Actually, in 1992 two Orthodox Churches with autocephalous status were established in Ukraine : the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP). The first one has existed since 1989; the second one was established under initiative of the former exarch of the Russian Orthodox Church for Ukraine (in the Soviet era), Metropolitan Filaret (Denysenko), who attempted to officially proclaim autocephaly for the whole Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The considerable part of the hierarchy and the faithful headed by Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate preserving the actual name of the church. Since then, there are three major Orthodox churches in Ukraine .

The main cause for the emergence of the two churches with an autocephalous status is a problem of leadership, in particular, that of the person of Patriarch of the UOC-KP Filaret. Being excommunicated by the Russian Orthodox Church, he is a regarded as a stumbling block for the hierarchy of the UAOC. After the death of Patriarch Dymytrii of the UAOC (25 February 2000), according to his testament, the Church accepted the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan of the UAOC in the Diaspora and the UOC in the USA, Konstantyn (Bahan), who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople. 40

Neither Ukrainian Orthodox Patriarchate is today recognized by any Orthodox church in the world. The main reason is the firm position of Moscow . At the turn of millennium, the Church of Constantinople expressed its desire to bring peace into the Orthodox life in Ukraine and recognize both churches with an autocephalous status under certain conditions. The process of recognition was halted, however, as a consequence of the fact that both churches have not adhered to these conditions.

The problem of non-recognition (and, consequently, non-canonicity) of both autocephalous churches seems to be their main “Achilles' heel”. Generally speaking, the status of “recognition” of a church is a very important element of interchurch diplomacy. However, when one is talking about ecumenism as reconciliation and the treatment of historical wounds, one usually has in mind phenomena outside the status quo . The example of two Ukrainian Orthodox churches whose autocephalous status is still not recognized by any Orthodox church may serve as a good illustration.

Neither of the two churches was represented at the Second European Ecumenical Assembly, as neither of them was a member of the Conference of European Churches (CEC). The principal of “recognition” was victorious. As a result, the assembly in Graz dealt with reconciliation in Europe without the participation of two churches of nearly 4300 total parishes, without which it is impossible to achieve reconciliation in Ukraine ! This happened just because Moscow considered them schismatic. Thus, the principle of recognition assumed an absolute character and began to contradict the task of reconciliation. The world Christian community would, certainly, have made a positive impact on the position of those Churches still burdened with historical wounds if they had been present at the Assembly. It did happen, for example, in the case of gay/lesbian Christian groups who, due to the support of Western Churches, had the opportunity to acquaint the participants with their position and enter the dialogue with them.

It is well known that a considerable number of churches that are recognized today first arose as the result of schism and were not recognized for long periods. However, in the course of time, the Christian world was compelled by exactly the need for reconciliation to accept the change of the status quo . In view of today's need for reconciliation, which is by no means less than before, the exclusion from the ecumenical process of Ukrainian churches of an autocephalous status, becomes even more strange and illogical. In any case, under the current conditions of establishing Ukrainian statehood, the policy of a principled non-recognition of the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy has no future. We will see this more clearly below as we consider what lies behind the problems of dialogue. [i.e. in section 2.3 Problems of Dialogue… ]

However, the expected recognition of autocephaly has put high demands on Orthodox Kyiv. Representatives of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly have to prove that they are worthy to be the vehicles of their future history. For they have the task of overcoming all the dangerous syndromes of the recent past, such as the syndrome of the “persecuted victim” and tendencies towards extreme nationalism, politicisation, and so on. The clergy of both of the Orthodox churches with an autocephalous leaning show strong isolationist sentiments, with a few thankful exceptions. Their failure to fulfil criteria for recognition established by Constantinople , from a certain perspective, suggests that both churches have much to do in the sphere of discipline and identity.

Positions on the notion of the “canonicity” of the territory of Ukraine also differ. Even if the ecclesial and canonical technicalities of this question are left aside, the very claim of the Moscow Patriarchate to a single-handed monopoly in defining the canonical status of the territory of Ukraine is not acceptable for Ukrainian Christians with a patriotic orientation. Therefore, the Russian scholar Nikolai Mitrokhin was absolutely right to have noted that “the word ‘canonicity,' hackneyed in propagandist battles, is now a synonym for the word ‘Russian' rather than for the word ‘legal' in western Ukraine, and probably in all Ukraine.” 41

2.3. Problems of Dialogue Between the Churches of the Kyivan Tradition.

Today in Ukraine (at least, in its western part, where transfers between Christian communities of the Kyivan tradition went on for 10 years) a certain balance of power has been established for the most part. This conclusion is especially true of the line of Orthodox-Catholic divide. Unfortunately, it does not follow from this that the situation has become free of dispute. However, today communities argue about to whom church buildings belong and not about their jurisdictions and confessional orientations. The changes of church orientation along the mentioned line of divide, as a rule, take place at the level of individuals rather than whole communities.

The situation of Ukrainian Orthodox communities of different jurisdictions is more complicated. The process of the redistribution of the faithful along the lines of the intra-Orthodox divide cannot be considered completed. The balance of power between Orthodox communities is more responsive to the sentiments of top state management. It is not a secret that today, contrary to the spirit and letter of the law, the presidential administration and governmental circles send out distinct signals (sometimes unnoticeable to outsiders but quite obvious for the top management) that the central authorities of Ukraine give preference to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate. This affects the attitude of the regional power elite to the communities of the other two Orthodox churches and, therefore, has a negative affect on the sentiments of the faithful.

History shows that dialogue becomes fruitful and constructive when all of the participants do not see any other alternative. The experience of Western Europe , gained as early as in the 17 th century during the 30-years War, became archetypal for Western ecumenists. Looking at Eastern Europe , particularly Ukraine , they assume a priori that Christians here also see no alternative other than dialogue. But, in reality, at least some parties involved in the Ukrainian tangle of contradictions are convinced that there is still an alternative to dialogue.

In numerous publications in the pro-Moscow Patriarchate press, one can trace the following method of thinking: the present situation of religious pluralism (particularly in Ukraine ) is artificial and temporary, caused by the weakness of the state. It was the weakening of the Soviet Union , headed then by Mykhail Gorbachev, that led to the legalization of the ecclesial “anomaly,” the UGCC, in 1988, and the establishment of “schismatic” Orthodox churches. Consequently, the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate was considerably weakened in Ukraine . Orthodoxy cannot (and should not) enter ecumenical dialogue under such conditions, as this can lead to excessive losses. Therefore, the main task is to bide the time until Russia , Ukraine and Belarus unite again, which will lead to a new, radical redistribution of forces in favour of Russian Orthodoxy. Then the Moscow Patriarchate will be able to enter the dialogue being in a stronger position than now. Well, this logic seems to be simply incommensurate with the logic of ecumenical dialogue.

So, as we see, the problem of the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is directly associated with the problem of Ukrainian state independence. Russian historiography denied Ukrainian independence for a long time and imposed the concept of “one Russian (later substituted with ‘Soviet') people.” The Russian Orthodox Church devotedly followed the authorities' position on the Ukrainian issue. The concept of “one church” clearly corresponded to the concept of “one nation.” Judging from publications of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church even today makes efforts to persuade believers that the “present breach of unity” of people and church is temporary and lacking God's blessing, and that that church still unites various nations “in one gigantic whole of the allegedly nonexistent country.” 42 Such expressions automatically make the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) to be seen as a representative of Russian imperial interests in the family of Ukrainian churches, instead of a representative of Ukraine in the Moscow Patriarchate.

The psychological difficulties, which the Moscow Patriarchate has with the recognition of Ukrainian independence, are not just the harmless inertness of the church's thinking. In church life, this is the main reason for not recognizing the right of Ukrainian Orthodoxy to autocephaly and, consequently, for not recognizing the existing autocephalous churches. In other words, in the view of the Moscow Patriarchate, the territory of Ukraine is still included in the “canonical territory” defined by the Russian Orthodox Church. This excludes any possibility for the proclamation of church autocephaly without the consent of the ROC. This focus, which in many Ukrainians' view has an imperialistic complexion, constitutes a serious historical obstacle in the way of reconciliation in Eastern Europe .

Let us note, in turn, that a typical reaction of Greek Catholics and Autocephalous Orthodox to the harm done to them by the Russian Orthodox Church is an effort to separate themselves totally from Moscow with a “wall of China .” In the case of Ukrainian Orthodox autocephaly, the ecclesial formula is even stronger: “neither Rome , nor Moscow ,” or “freeing Ukraine from the bondage of both Romes.” It is clear that this position of double denial is not conducive either to reconciliation inside Ukraine or to active ecumenical initiatives of that church in the international context. The world has become too small for the faithful of the national churches to be able to find a safe place in complete isolation from the life of Russian Orthodoxy. It is necessary to seek models for coexistence jointly, which would at least reduce the threat felt by all parties concerned.

In the view of the Russian Orthodox Church, “the establishment of the legal principle of freedom of conscience indicates that society has lost its religious values and purpose, witnesses about mass apostasy and actual indifference to the church's cause and to the victory over sin.” 45 The Moscow Patriarchate presents the revival of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine solely as the result of Catholic proselytism and state intervention, without even mentioning the right of Ukrainian citizens to freedom of religious self-determination. For, of course, the motto “Ukraine – an Orthodox country” does not provide in principle for any Ukrainian Catholicism. Neither does the Moscow Patriarchate apply this right to the Ukrainian Orthodox churches of autocephalous orientation, which are viewed by it as a product of solely nationalistic and heretical perversions.

However, both mottos are dangerous because both of them equally question one of the most important achievements of modern Ukraine, religious freedom. The recognition of the principle of religious freedom makes all the mentioned participants of religious discourse in Ukraine equal partners at various levels of interchurch relations. On the other hand, the absoluteness of the ecclesial vision of the Moscow Patriarchate totally negates such partnership and leaves only one participant (itself) at the negotiating table. And the positions of some Greek Catholics and Autocephalous Orthodox are also too burdened with the reflexivity of historic offences and saturated with political arguments to be really dialogical (in the European sense of the word).

2.4. The Influence of the Roman Catholic Church on Ecumenical Processes in Ukraine .

For more than six centuries, the Roman Catholic Church has been represented in Ukraine mainly by the Roman Catholic Church of Poland. This church had its strongest influence in Ukraine exactly at the time when its position was dominated by soteriologic exclusivism and the post-tridentine principle praestantia ritus latini (the superiority of the Latin rite). There is no wonder, therefore, that the relations between the Ukrainian churches and the Roman Catholic Church of Poland are considerably burdened with history, and that the mentality of many Ukrainians is dominated by an established stereotype of distrust of Catholics (especially with Ukrainians who have no contact with the modernized, post-conciliar Catholic Church).

Among the main questions still troubling Ukrainians, one can single out the following issues:

First , the forms of inculturation of the Catholic Church in the Ukrainian environment are still not distinct. Today, one increasingly often sees Roman Catholic churches where liturgies are served according to the Latin rite, but in the Ukrainian language and even with the use of Ukrainian ornamentation, whereas for many centuries it was the preservation of the Eastern “Byzantine” rite that was considered the natural form of inculturation. This question is particularly important for Greek Catholic clergy who are troubled to see the Latin Church advancing to eastern Ukraine, often bypassing the Greek Catholic Church. The latter is held back not only by state factors but at times also by certain circumstances of the bilateral dialogue between Rome and Moscow, as well as the interpretation quite widespread, apparently, in the Vatican that the UGCC is primarily a regional (Galician, i.e. Western Ukrainian) Church.

Second , there is still no solution to the problem of the inequality of Roman and Greek (Eastern) Catholic clergy within the Universal Church. For instance, in places where the Latin Church is in the majority, Poland for example, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy are subjected to the Roman Catholic hierarchy, despite the fact that the Roman Catholic clergy in Ukraine were never in subordination to the Greek Catholic hierarchy, which is in a vast majority here. Then, there is concern that the Greek Catholic structures of the Transcarpathia Province , which is part of the territory of Ukraine , have been placed directly under Vatican jurisdiction rather than being part of greater Greek Catholic configuration. This legitimises separatist tendencies in the Greek Catholic Church still weakened by recent persecutions. A relatively recent outburst of emotions was caused by a letter of 4 March 1998 from the Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Angelo Sodano to the Apostolic Nuncio in Poland . The letter obliged Greek Catholic priests in Poland , contrary to the historic tradition of the UGCC, to “keep the discipline of celibacy” or leave Poland if married and “return to the eparchies of their origin in Ukraine .” 46All these cases, unfortunately, illustrate the previously mentioned principle of the superiority of the Latin rite, a syndrome which revives old offences and fears – for Greek Catholics and Orthodox alike.

Third , there is some concern among Ukrainians over the fact that the percentage of ethnic Poles (including Polish citizens) in the Roman Catholic clergy in Ukraine is disproportionately large, and parishes headed by them at times become epicentres not only of evangelisation but also of the polonization (or re-polonization) of the local population. This also has to do with a stereotype of suspicion about possible recurrences of the old Polish “mission to the East,” that is, the polonization and latinization of Ukrainians.

The remaining presence of anti-Polish sentiments (which in the church context almost automatically means anti-Latin sentiments) among some Greek Catholics was expressed, for example, in their strong reaction to Cardinal Jaworski's address to the president of Ukraine of 26 July 2002. The cardinal requested that a number of church buildings, which belonged to the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine in the past be returned, though some of them were recently passed to Greek Catholic communities (because of the reduction of the number of RCC faithful). The mirror anti-Ukrainian and anti-Greek-Catholic sentiments may be traced among Roman Catholics in eastern Poland , especially in Przemysl, where even a dome of the former Greek-Catholic cathedral was rebuilt into a typical Latin style in order to wipe out any cultural sign of Ukrainian presence in the city. 47

At the same time, despite these difficulties, the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine today shows characteristics which were not typical as recently as a few decades ago. The clergy generally recognize the legitimate status of the Eastern rite (it was considered schismatic in the past) and support the independence of the Ukrainian state. It is making efforts to participate in various ecumenical events and joint prayer services. (It has to be noted, however, that it supports rather than initiates them.) The Roman Catholic clergy in Ukraine do not normally campaign against Ukrainian churches, avoiding negative remarks about them (However, recently some accusations of “nationalism” with regard to the UGCC's efforts to achieve patriarchal status were publicly expressed by Latin clergy).

Justice must also be done to the efforts towards understanding made by the hierarchy, intelligentsia and younger generations of Poles and Ukrainians, which are conducive to healing the wounds of the past. Let me give you one example.

A few years ago, some controversy took place around the Polish military memorial cemetery “Orląt” in Lviv. On the one hand, this memorial plays an important role in the historical memory of Poles either in Poland or Ukraine . Polish heroes are buried there, and it is clear that the Polish side has a right to maintain the memorial in an appropriate condition. On the other hand, the memorial was erected immediately after the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918 and was intended to demonstrate the glorious victory of Polish arms over Ukrainian ones. It is obvious that many Ukrainians considered the restoration of all elements of the memorial as an offensive confrontation. Some politicians and state officials made a lot of mistakes but my intention is to show what Churches may do in such a situation. Both Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic communities headed by Cardinals Husar and Jaworsky correspondingly organized common prayers on the Ukrainian and Polish cemeteries erected on the site in commemoration of all the heroes of the 1918 war 48. Intellectuals from Ukraine and Poland supported this initiative. As a result, the atmosphere around the memorial became less tense.

One may draw the general conclusion that the more that Roman Catholic clergy and faithful break established stereotypes through modernized forms of activity and rethinking the forms of church unity, the stronger is the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine and its influence on ecumenical processes. (The same, as will be shown later, is valid for the clergy and faithful of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.)

What is also new for the modern Ukraine is that we all live in a globalized world, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholics have entered intensive contacts also with other particular Roman Catholic Churches. More and more, the whole notion of Catholicity is losing its Polish-centricity. The Roman Catholic Church provides considerable financial assistance to Catholic and Orthodox churches in Ukraine , which plays a crucial role in their revival. It is not strange, therefore, that the visit of John Paul II to Ukraine marked a revolutionary change in the image of Catholic Church in the country in general.

2.5. The Influence of Protestant Churches on Ecumenical Processes in Ukraine.

In this section I will deal with the situation of local Protestant churches, which, during the last century, have become a familiar part of the Ukrainian religious landscape. The largest Protestant denominations with the most registered communities are the following: Baptist Union (2,367), Pentecostal Union (1,424), and the 7 th Day Adventists (991); (for more information, see Appendix 1) Their long existence as religious minorities and persecutions under the Soviet power left an imprint on the self-awareness of their faithful, which is manifested in their inclination to self-isolation and mistrust. In addition, the features formed in all the people by the communist system are undoubtedly, to some extent, characteristic of Protestants as well. As a result, the differences in mentality within some large Protestant church between fellow-believers from the West and from Ukraine can be even stronger than between faithful of different churches in Ukraine . One has to consider this peculiarity while predicting the reaction of local Protestant churches to the ecumenical challenge coming from the West.

The transition from complete isolation to the domination of foreign missionaries was too abrupt for Ukrainians to be able to bear it patiently. In the beginning, the local population's general attitude to mostly Protestant missionaries was favourable, as they were viewed as carriers of religious faith, which had been persecuted in the USSR . In a few years, however, the sentiments changed to the opposite. Many churches in Ukraine (mostly Orthodox) accused missionaries of “stealing sheep from the sheepfold” and, following the example of Russia, actively sought to pass laws, which would restrict the activity of foreign religious missions in Ukraine. Under pressure from these churches, in 1993 the Supreme Council (Parliament) of Ukraine made amendments to the Law of Freedom of Conscience. The amendments were of an explicitly restrictive character. As a result, the Ukrainian mentality underwent a certain shift from a trustful openness before the world (in which people longed to have contact during the period of the Berlin wall and ”locked borders”) to a kind of isolationism, caused by distrust and disillusionment.

The adoption of the amendments to the law on freedom of conscience by the Supreme Council of Ukraine in 1993 was the state's attempt to partially renew the protective screen in front of local churches. However, this kind of “protection,” from a certain point of view, means maintaining neglected illnesses. Much is said in post-soviet territory about the losses to society caused by the activities of Western Protestant missionaries. However, no analysis has yet been made of the positive aspects of these activities, particularly the wholesome effect of competition imposed by Western missionaries on local clergy, who were forced to look for new ways of influencing their flock. We are evidently going to see a wholesome effect from the Western theological challenge as well. It will, undoubtedly, revitalize Eastern theology.

The attention that Protestants pay to people's social position may also be important as an encouraging example. This Protestant “socio-centricity” is often seen by faithful of the Orthodox and Catholic traditions in a somewhat distorted light when the sincerity of the Christian ministry of Protestants to people is questioned. However, given the current conditions of economic and social crisis in Ukraine , the social mission of Protestant churches 49 is not only important in itself. As a challenge to the so-called “historic” churches, this mission has a stimulating effect on the implementation of their own social programs.

The presence of Protestant churches in the country is an important restraining factor, preventing state officials from creating policies oriented towards only one, influential church. The cumulative influence of Protestantism is strong enough to accustom the society to civilized coexistence under the conditions of confessional pluralism.

As to the ecumenical potential of Protestant churches in Ukraine , it is worth mentioning the complexity of assessing the influence of Protestantism on the religious identity of Ukrainians. Unlike early Protestantism in Western Europe , in Ukraine neither early nor late Protestantism was based on the principle cuius regio eius religio , which so much helped the nation-building movements in Western Europe in the 16 th century. Protestantism in Ukraine , as a rule, was not concerned with the problems of Ukrainian national self-determination. According to Viktoria Liubashchenko, an expert on Protestantism, the latter was mostly a “cultural and educational factor.” 50 As a consequence, unlike the Orthodox or Greek Catholic churches, the Ukrainian branches of Protestantism traditionally have not been considered national churches of the Ukrainian people. At the same time, it does not follow from this statement, by any means, that local Protestants did not have a cumulative influence on Ukrainian religious awareness, and, consequently, on Ukrainian religious identity.

In general, it can be argued that local Protestant communities in Ukraine have not yet become an active factor in the ecumenical movement. On the one hand, there is a considerable reluctance of the so-called “historic” churches of Ukraine to any reconciliation with Protestant groups who engage in active proselytism. On the other hand, the position of some Evangelical Protestant groups is characterized by considerable intolerance, too. Most of them, as a rule, use the oversights and errors of the “traditional” churches as a battlefield of competition. In this case, the logic of strong competition for the souls of the faithful fully dominates the logic of reconciliation and cooperation. It is not strange, therefore, that some Protestant groups (Ukrainian Baptists, for example) even restrain themselves from taking part in ecumenical events trying to avoid involvement in the doctrinally foreign projects of other denominations.

Predictably enough, there is no official dialogue between the majority of Protestant denominations and the “historic” churches. However, their representatives meet occasionally during official meetings organized by state authorities or at scholarly conferences held by academic institutions. Obviously, such meetings cannot be called ecumenical meetings proper but they are still steps on to road to getting to know each other.

22 It should be noted that today in Ukraine there is no scholarly, reliable information about the number of faithful of various religious communities. Therefore, assessment of the influence of religious organizations only by the number of communities may produce inaccurate information. Beside that, statistics do not show the number of unbelievers in Ukraine , which is estimated at 34-37% by some researchers [see Alexei D. Krindatch, Religion as a Component of Regional and Political Differentiations in the Post-Soviet Ukraine (manuscript ; alkrin@online.ru)].